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COMMENTS
alternative but to admit any applicant who has fulfilled the pre-
scribed requirements. Not one of these courts construed shall as
being a directory provision, which would allow the judiciary to
provide additional requirements for admission to the bar. It
should be noted that where legislatures have drafted similar
statutes but have substituted the word may in place of the word
shall, courts have held these laws simply directory-and con-
stitutional. In such instances the courts retained power to add
further qualifications to those demanded by law. The rule of
these decisions is well stated in In re Greer :23
It is true that the legislatures of the various states may, and
often do, prescribe minimum qualifications which must be
possessed by those who desire . . to practice [law], and
the courts will require all applicants to comply with the
legislative conditions... but notwithstanding that an appli-
cant may possess the qualifications required by the legisla-
ture, this does not entitle him to admission to practice unless
the court is satisfied that such qualifications are sufficient.24
In other words, the legislature, by virtue of its police power,
may prescribe reasonable conditions to an applicant's admission
to the bar. But in no case has the legislature been allowed to set
the maximum requirements beyond which the judicial depart-
ment may go. This proposition represents the great weight of
authority25 and the Kaufmann decision is consistent therewith.
WALTER M. CLARK
TORTS--GUEST STATUTE APPLICATION BROADENED-PROTEC-
TION WHILE GUEST ENTERING CAR DURING TRIP.-Ella Castle
had been accompanying McKeown in his auto on a day-long sum-
mer outing from Lansing to a nearby lake resort. Returning that
evening and still some distance from the Michigan capital, Mc-
Keown stopped his car on an upgrade to examine a soft rear
23. 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P.2d 96 (1938).
24. Id. at 390, 81 P.2d at 98.
25. Keeley v. Evans, Dis't Atty. et al., 271 Fed. 520 (D.C. Ore. 1921);
In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935) ; In re Chapelle, 71 Cal. App.
129, 234 Pac. 906 (1925); Freeling v. Tucker, 45 Idaho 475, 289 Pac. 85
(1930) ; Anderson v. Coolin, 27 Idaho 334, 149 Pac. 286 (1915) ; Hanson v.
Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646 (1911); Ex parte Steckler et al., 179'
La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934); In re Opinion of Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180
N.E. 725 (1932); State ex rel. Johnson, Atty. Gen. v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91,
295 N.W. 381 (1941); In re Crum, 103 Ore. 296, 209 Pac. 948 (1922);
Vernon City Bar Association v. McKibbin, 153 Wis. 350, 141 N.W. 283
(1913).
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tire. While he was thus engaged, Mrs. Castle-who was pur-.
portedly ill-also left the car and went some distance into an
adjacent field. She returned a few minutes later and on opening
the right hand door of the machine, with one foot on the running
board and the obvious intention of getting in, the car proceeded
to roll backwards throwing her legs under the wheels. She sub-.
sequently sued McKeown for damages resulting from his alleged
negligence. The Supreme Court of Michigan deemed the appli-.
cable law under the facts to be contained in
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.1446 (1948):
.. no person, transported by the owner or operator of a
motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such trans-
portation, shall have a cause of action for damages against
such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of
accident unless such accident shall have been caused by the
gross negligence or wilful or wanton misconduct of such
owner or operator ....
On the basis of this guest statute the court affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court for defendant, holding that the gratuitous
transportation of the plaintiff continued throughout the period
of the brief interruption of the trip, and that at the time of the
injury the plaintiff was still the guest of the defendant and
therefore could not recover without a showing of gross negli-
gence. Plaintiff did not attempt to argue that there had been
"gross" negligence but simple claimed that she had not been a
"guest" while standing on the running board and thus only
needed proof of ordinary negligence.'
At common law an automobile driver is bound to exercise rea-
sonable care for the protection of a gratuitous passenger. 2 To-
day, however, probably as a protection for insurance companies
against collusive suits between host and guest, approximately
one-half of the states have enacted guest statutes which preclude
recovery by an automobile guest against a negligent host unless
a more serious departure from the standards of ordinary care
can be shown.3 In a few other states a similar doctrine has arisen
without the aid of a statute as an amplification of the common
law.,
1. Castle v. McKeown, 327 Mich. 518, 42 N.W.2d 733 (1950).
2. PRossER, TORTS 634 (1941).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. The author suggests that this extension of the common law may
have arisen as an analogy to the cases on gratuitous bailment of chattels.
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In interpreting these various laws regarding the automobile
guest it is often extremely difficult to determine at what point
one becomes a guest and just when this relationship ceases. The
Michigan Court in holding that the plaintiff remained an auto-
mobile guest even while she was temporarily absent from the
defendant's car seems in disagreement with the views of the ma-
jority of prior cases decided under similar guest statutes where
the courts have preferred a more literal interpretation of the
statutory language. This more restricted view is typified by the
decisions of Iowa and California where the physical position of
the plaintiff in relation to the defendant's automobile seems to be
the sole criterion for establishing or denying the existence of
the guest status.
The Iowa and early California guest statutes5 denied damages
to any person "riding in" another's automobile as his guest ex-
cept where gross negligence or intoxication was shown. Thus
in Puckett v. Pailth)rpe- the plaintiff was not a guest when she
was injured while trying to open the door of the defendant's car,
nor was the plaintiff in Moreas v. FerryT who got out to crank
the defendant's car during a momentary pause in their trip.
The same reasoning was applied by the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin in their interpretation of a similarly worded Illinois stat-
ute when the plaintiff was injured after he had alighted from
the defendant's car -.o help change a tire.8
After the Moreas case the California statute was changed so
that the words "while so riding" were removed, but the new
statute9 contained the phrase "during such ride," and the former
interpretation was retained. So where the plaintiff was injured
while moving from the back seat to the front seat of the defen-
dant's parked automobile and had "one foot on the ground and
the other on the running board" ;,' where the plaintiff left the
defendant's car to mail a letter intending to return immedi-
ately;" where the plaintiff was about to enter the defendant's
5. IOWA CODE § 502(bl (1927); CALIF. ST. § 141 % (1923).
6. 207 Iowa 613, 223 N.W. 254 (1929).
7. 135 Cal. App. 202: 26 P.2d 886 (1933).
8. Rohr v. Employers Liability Assur. Corporation, Ltd., of London, 243
Wis. 113, 9 N.W.2d 62 1 (1943).
9. CALIFORNiA VEHIcLE CODE § 403 (1935).
10. Prager v. Isreal, 15 Cal.2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940).
11. Harrison et al. v. Gamatero et al., 52 Cal. App. 2d 178, 125 P.2d 904
(1942).
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car having her hand on the door handle with one foot in the air
and one foot on the groundl 2 the California courts maintained
that in each case the host-guest relationship did not exist at the
moment of the injury and that the plaintiff could recover with a
showing of only ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant.
The Ohio court following the lead of California held that the
plaintiff was not a guest when she left the front seat of the de-
fendant's car and stood about two feet away to give the defendant
more room to find her keys as they were preparing to drive home
from a social gathering. 3 Here the statute14 described a "guest"
as one who is "in or upon" the motor vehicle of another.
Even the earlier Michigan cases seem to have preferred the
strict interpretation of that state's guest statute, and it was held
that the plaintiff who had taken one or two steps away from the
defendant's car after she had been driven to her home by the
defendant was no longer a guest;15 nor was the plaintiff who had
been traveling with the defendant and had left the defendant's
car for two or three hours and then was injured while attempt-
ing to crank the car before re-entering. 6
The alternative view as to the instant of time at which one
becomes, and then ceases to be an automobile guest is typified by
the decision of Massachusetts where, although there is no guest
statute, a similar doctrine has arisen as an extension of the com-
mon law. The Massachusetts rule, which tends to stress the in-
tent of the driver and his passenger rather than their actual
physical location, is expressed in Ruel v. Langelier:
.. it must be clear that the defendant's duty does not de-
pend upon the physical position of the plaintiff at the mo-
ment of the accident, or whether she was then in the defen-
dant's automobile or outside of it, or upon whether in
everyday language she would be described as a guest. The
degree of the defendant's duty depends upon whether the
act of the defendant claimed to be negligent was an act per-
formed in the course of carrying out the gratuitous under-
taking which the defendant had assumed.17
This doctrine has been applied in subsequent Massachusetts
cases where the court considered the plaintiff to be a guest after
12. Smith et ux. v. Pope, 53 Cal. App.2d 43, 127 P.2d 292 (1942).
13. Eshelman v. Wilson, 83 Ohio App. 395, 80 N.E.2d 803 (1948).
14. OHIo GEN. CODE, § 6308-6 (Throckmorton, 1933).
15. Brown v. Arnold, 303 Mich. 616, 6 N.W.2d 914 (1942).
16. Hunter v. Baldwin, et aL, 268 Mich. 106, 255 N.W. 431 (1934).
17. 299 Mass. 240, 12 N.E.2d 735 (1938).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss4/11
COMMENTS
having stepped from the defendant's car onto the driveway at
the termination of their trip ;28 after having alighted from the de-
fendant's car to direct the latter's parking;19 where the plaintiff
was entering the defendant's car, with her "right foot in the air
and her left foot on the curb" ;20 where the plaintiff was standing
beside the defendant's car with one foot on the running board
during an interruption of their trip ;21 and where the plaintiff
was standing on the sidewalk awaiting the defendant who was
driving his car to the nearby curb.22
This doctrine also seems to have been accepted by the Supreme
Court of Kansas where it was held that the plaintiff who had
been injured attempting to close the door of the defendant's car
after having alighted therefrom at her home was still a guest and
in the terms of the statute was still being "transported" by the
defendant.23 Further, when defendant driver slammed the door
on plaintiff's hand while the latter was entering the car, the
Connecticut court found a guest-host relationship present and,
of course, concomitant statutory inability to sue.24 The opinion
in the former and much more recent case stated:
Both parties agree that a defendant's, a host's, duty depends
upon whether the claimed act of the host's negligence was
an act performed in the course of carrying out the gratui-
tous undertaking which the host had assumed.25
The principal case, as well as the Kansas and Connecticut de-
cisions, seem to be following the lead of the Massachusetts courts
in placing an interpretation on the statute which, while it is not
so literal, seems far more realistic than the interpretation of the
California and Iowa courts. If the real purpose of the guest
statutes is to preclude the possibility of collusive suits between
the host and guest, then the actual physical position of the
parties would seem of less importance than their obvious mental
acceptance of the host-guest status. Accordingly, recovery was
properly denied in Castle v. McKeown for there would seem to
18. Adams v. Baker, 317 Mass. 748, 59 N.E.2d 701 (1945).
19. Bragdon v. Dinsmore, 312 Mass. 628, 45 N.E.2d 833 (1942).
20. Head v. Morton, 302 Mass. 273, 19 N.E.2d 22 (1939).
21. Ethier v. Audette, 307 Mass. 111, 29 N.E.2d 707 (1940).
22. Donahue v. Kelley, 306 Mass. 511, 29 N.E. 2d 10 (1940).
23. Marsh v. Hogeboom, 167 Kan. 349, 205 P.2d 1190 (1949).
24. Nemoitin v. Berger, 111 Conn. 88, 149 Atl. 233 (1930).
25. Marsh v. Hogeboom, 167 Kan. 349, 351, 205 P.2d 1190, 1192 (1949).
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be no doubt as to the complete absence of mental reservations on
the part of the plaintiff in her continuing role as defendant's
guest from the initial phases of the trip until the time of the
accident.
EDWIN CHARLU
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